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“Gender is deeply embedded in determining who moves, how those moves take place, and the 
resultant futures of migrant women and families”(Monica Boyd). 
  
Introduction 
Women account for almost half of the stock of total migrant population at the world level 
(World Bank 2007). Since the 1960s the part of women in international migration flows has 
been on a constant rise. In spite of their growing importance in migration flows, research on 
the migration of women has been until now scarce. Furthermore, research on women 
migration has focused so far mainly on women migrating to North America. Studies that 
consider women migration in Europe are even scarcer and usually consider migrants in their 
countries of destination. Therefore, the interest of our study lies both in its focus on women’s 
migration and on a new EU country. 
Officially, Romania is considered to be the source country of about two and a half million 
migrants out of which more than half are females (NID 2007). In fact, the actual number of 
migrants is underestimated. Most of these migrants are young, over 50% of them being in the 
26-39 age range. The part of women in migration flows from Romania has been steadily 
increasing since 1990 (see Appendix II). In 1992, women accounted for 51.63% of the 
permanent migration flows. Their part had reached 62.42% by 2005 (NIS 2006). According to 
NIS in 2006 highly-skilled migrants accounted for about 13% of total flows. The migration of 
young women triggers a double loss for the state of origin. First of all, it represents a loss in 
terms of their own human capital. This loss can be quite important as women’s domination in 
highly-skilled migration flows from Eastern Europe was long acknowledged by migration 
specialists (Badie and de Wenden 2001), Romania making no exception to this trend. In 
addition, considering their age, most of these women are potential mothers, engendering 
another decrease in human capital by the loss of potential unborn population. Thus, women’s 
migration contributes through its direct and indirect component to the overall decrease in 
Romanian population. This decrease has reached important figures and cannot be overlooked. 
It is estimated that between the last two censuses in 1992 and respectively 2002, Romania lost 
1.1 million inhabitants. This decrease represents almost 5% of the overall Romanian 
population (see Appendix II). Official recorded migration accounted for a mere 12% of this 
decrease, whereas the rest was due to the natural decrease (27%) and especially to unrecorded 
migration (78%).  
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Although women are dominant in permanent migration flows, in the case of temporary labour 
migration flows men account for the most important part. In addition to push factors at home 
like the level of unemployment and low income, the composition of temporary labour 
migration flows is also shaped by the structure of the demand at destination and by the 
migration laws adopted by the host countries.  
Migration propensities also vary across regions within Romania, with some main sending 
regions where an important part of the labour force works abroad and others with very low 
migration rates. Whereas in some regions, migration is nowadays so embedded in social 
awareness that it has become a “rite of passage” for individuals as predicted by the cumulative 
causation theory (Massey, Goldring, and Durand 1994), it is unlikely that this ‘social norm’ 
applies also to women. One of the aims of our study is to find a possible explanation to this 
matter. 
Why do we focus on women? There is nowadays a growing awareness on the part played by 
women in economic development. Studies show that gender is a critical source of intra- 
household heterogeneity that can shape resource allocations (Schultz, 1990, Udry 1996, 
Jacoby 1998, Duflo and Udry 2004) and that women’s importance in the raising and 
education of children is crucial. As shown by several studies, women’s preferences are more 
likely to be linked to their children’s well-being than men’s. For instance, Lundberg, Pollack 
and Wales (1997) looking into the changes brought by a British law that substitutes tax 
reduction for child benefits operated on fathers’ paychecks with a direct cash payment to 
mothers, found that consumption patterns of households also changed, with a larger part of 
consumption expenditures going to clothes for children and women and less to alcohol and 
tobacco. Another study by Philips and Burton (1998) on Canadian couples also proves that 
child caring expenses were supported by women’s exogenous income. Due to their role in 
child rearing women are directly involved in the human capital formation process which is a 
key variable in the endogenous growth theory. 
Furthermore, women tend to remit a larger proportion of their resources than men, and focus 
those funds more on social welfare (UN 2006). Empirical studies show that women remit 
more than men and that they do so mainly for altruistic reasons performing an insurance 
function for their households, while men have more egoistic reasons (Lee et al. 1994, de la 
Brière 2002, Vanwey 2004). In Romania remittances have reached a very important level and 
stood at 4.3 billion euros in 2005, their amount being equal to inward FDI (NBR 2006). 
However, no study has tried so far to disentangle the origin of the remittance inflow.   
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In spite of this state of affairs, most of the studies on the determinants of migration do not take 
into account gender differences. Gender is used only as a control variable. However, it is most 
unlikely that man and women take the decision to migrate in the same way as determinants 
seem to differ between women and men. Empirical data show that migration patterns of men 
and women are different. Moreover, married women migrate less than men. This might be 
explained by the role men and women are supposed to play in society. Traditionally men have 
the culturally defined obligations of providing for the household and of protecting female 
members and dependants whereas women are responsible for domestic duties and play a key 
role in maintaining the integrity of the family (Le Vine 1993). Becker (1991) argues that the 
economic rationale for the fact that women are the main time contributors to domestic 
production lies in their comparative advantage in producing public household goods. On the 
other hand, migration prospects and patterns differ because women do not face the same 
income and employment opportunities neither in the home country nor in the foreign labour 
market. Moreover, due to the fact that men and women involve in different activities in their 
home country, the opportunity cost of migrating varies with gender as does the physical cost 
of migration. And last, risk aversion and perception of possible gain are different for women 
and for men. 
Our paper is organized as follows: section two sets the background of our study. We proceed 
in section three with a review of the literature on the migration decision. Section four presents 
the theoretical model, whereas in section five we develop the empirical model. In section six 
we describe the data and the variables employed and in section seven we analyse our main 
results. Then we conclude.  
 
2. Background 
Gender is socially constructed. According to Monica Boyd (2003) gender represents a matrix 
of identities, behaviours, and power relationships that are constructed by the culture of a 
society in accordance with sex. The degree to which this social norm is binding varies across 
individuals and households as does the cost of deviating from the commonly accepted norm.  
This cost can be termed as social stigma. Link and Phelan (2001) consider that every stigma 
has four components explaining how stigma becomes a cost. In the first component of the 
stigma, people distinguish and label human differences. In the second, due to dominant 
cultural beliefs these labelled persons are linked to undesirable characteristics and to negative 
stereotypes. Then, they are placed in distinct categories in order to accomplish a separation of 
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“us" from “them". And last, labelled persons experience status loss and discrimination that 
leads to unequal outcomes. 
However, gender is not immutable, but also prone to change and, in this sense, it is both 
socially constructed and reconstructed through time as the extent to which people believe in 
the norm is given by social interactions. By following the norm or departing from it, people 
can either reaffirm or change what gender means and how social relationships are built at a 
particular time and in a particular setting.  
It is in this sense that the culture of the sending society plays an important part in determining 
the likelihood that women will migrate. As stated by Boyd (2003) a woman's position in her 
sending community influences at the same time her ability to autonomously decide to migrate 
and to access the resources necessary to do so and the opportunity she has to migrate. 
How was gender defined in 2002 Romania? In 2002 many of the patriarchal values of a 
traditional society were still dominant in Romania especially in rural areas. Men are seen as 
income providers whereas women do most of the household chores.   
The 2000 Romanian Gender Barometer shows the main roles assigned by society to men and 
women. Over 63% of the people interviewed considered that it is women’s duty more than 
men’s to undertake the housework and 70% said that it is men’s duty more than women’s to 
provide for their household. Moreover, 78% of the people think that a woman must follow her 
spouse. The majority (53%) also believe that men are not as able as women to raise children.  
In 83% of the cases the man is the head of the family. However, in the majority of cases 
(61%) the woman is seen as the mistress of the house and in almost half of the cases (45%) 
the woman decides how the income of the household should be spent. For 40% of the cases 
the budget allocation decision is taken jointly by both spouses. At the level of domestic 
activities, in almost 90% of the households interviewed women are the ones to do the 
cooking, the cleaning, to wash clothes and dishes and to do the ironing.  In what child rearing 
is concerned, according to 70% of the respondents, women are those who look after the child 
daily, supervise his homework, take him to the doctor and collect him from school. Most of 
the men (76%) think that their wife is more skilled when it comes to these activities, though 
71% of the interviewees consider that both parents should be involved in child rearing. At the 
same time, in 80% of the households, men wash the family car and do the plumbing.  The 
2002 National Report on the Equality of Chances between Men and Women also emphasizes 
the fact that women involve in bringing up children, taking care of the elderly and other 
household activities like cooking or doing the laundry, whereas the main role of men is to 
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provide for their household and to do small household jobs like plumbing. All this points to a 
clear gender division when it comes to domestic tasks. 
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On the Romanian labour market women work mostly in the health sector, financial services, 
education, in trade and telecommunications and in agriculture. In 2002, the average wage gap 
between men and women stood at 8.5%. This wage gap can be explained partly by gender 
discrimination and partly by differences in skills. However, these differences could also be 
triggered to a certain extent by discrimination. Due to the socially assigned roles, women are 
less likely to invest in skills that could be useful on the labour market and throughout their life 
acquire skills necessary to domestic production in which they are prone to specialize. Baker 
and Jacobsen (2005) emphasize that while this customary gender distribution of labour 
determines skill acquisition and improves household efficiency, it clearly disadvantages one 
gender.  
 
3. Literature Review 
 
Most of the models taking into account migration have thus far considered migration either as 
being an outcome of a decision process at the level of the household or of an individual 
decision making process. 
  NE S Buc Centru NV V SE   SV
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The beginnings: the individual migration model 
In the seminal work by Todaro (1969) and in that of Harris and Todaro (1970) migration 
occurs as a consequence of income maximization. The decision is taken at the individual level 
following a cost-benefit analysis. Thadani and Todaro (1984) admit that while these models 
can explain male migration, they are not fit for women’s migration. The individual model 
does not allow for differences in the determinants of migration between men and women 
failing to explain the gender selectivity of internal migration except with reference to 
individual income and employment differences. Therefore as Thadani and Todaro (1984) 
argued it is “sex-specific … to male migration” and as a consequence “special … rather than 
general”. The Thadani and Todaro (1984) model suggests that a distinguishing feature of 
female internal migration compared to male migration is the importance of marriage as a 
reason to migrate. However, tests run by Behrman and Wolfe (1984) and by Findley and 
Diallo (1993) prove that while women’s migration may seem social in nature it is determined 
mainly by economic variables at destination.  
The joint-migration model 
One of the drawbacks of the Todaro model is that it treats migration as an individual, as 
opposed to a household-level decision. Even if migration might occur in response to expected 
income differentials (among other factors), it is unlikely that individuals make the decision to 
move without considering the household of which they are a member.  
We now turn to a strand of literature that attempts to address this issue. The first contribution 
placing the migration decision at the level of the family is that of Mincer (1978) who argues 
that migration is motivated by the “net family gain rather than net personal gain”. His model 
considers that migration is undertaken jointly by family members so that some family 
members may be “tied movers” or “tied stayers” (Mincer 1978). A tied mover is one whose 
individual gain from migration is negative when the overall family gain from migration is 
positive. In contrast, a tied stayer is one whose individual gain from not migrating is negative 
when the overall family gain from not migrating is positive (Pfeiffer et al. 2007).  According 
to Compton and Pollack (2004) women are more likely than men to be tied movers, while 
men are more likely to be tied stayers than tied movers. Frank (1978) argues that expectations 
of migration based on the maximization of net family welfare could explain the male-female 
wage gap. As their opportunity set is limited by their spouses’ location choices, women do not 
have an incentive to invest in their own human capital. One of the joint model’s drawbacks is 
that it does not consider possible frictions between household members over migration 
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decisions (Cooke 2003). It is assumed that each individual is endowed with the same 
bargaining power. The tied mover hypothesis has been empirically tested both for developed 
and developing economies and internal and international migrants. Studies of couple 
migration by Spitze (1984), Bird and Bird (1985), Morrison and Lichter (1988), Shihadeh 
(1991), Cackely (1993) Cooke and Bailey (1996), and Jacobsen and Levin (1997) are 
consistent with this joint-migration framework. For instance, in a study of international 
immigrants to Canada, a developed country, Baker and Benjamin (1997) found that women in 
immigrant families take on “dead-end” jobs to finance their spouses’ investments in human 
capital until the migrant men can obtain more stable employment. Similarly, Chattopadyhyav 
(1998) finds a negative impact of joint migration on women’s economic achievements. A 
more recent study by Cooke (2003) acknowledges a positive effect of migration on income 
which is due to an increase in the husband’s, not the wife’s income.  
The New Economics of Labour Migration and models of ‘split’ migration  
The New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) originating in the works of Oded Stark 
builds on the Mincerian model. One of the advantages of the NELM is that it allows for the 
possibility of “split” migration. Although individual household members may recur to 
migration, the household survives as an economic and social unit in the home area in spite of 
the changes brought to its demographic composition. In this model, migration is undertaken 
by individuals as members of larger social units, usually households, and both determinants 
and impacts of migration are analyzed in the context of households and of home communities. 
According to this approach, the migration decision occurs rather as a consequence of capital, 
credit or insurance market imperfections or of relative deprivation than of labour market 
inequalities (Stark and Levhari 1982, Stark 1991, Stark and Taylor 1991). Migration acts as 
insurance for the households which undertook risky agricultural activities. Migrants enter into 
implicit contractual arrangements with other household members in which the latter fund the 
costs of migration and migrants subsequently provide remittances in return. In this 
cooperative game framework, both the migrant and nonmigrant parties must increase their 
utility or expected income in comparison to other relevant alternatives in order for migration 
to occur. Migrants honour their obligations either for altruistic reasons or because they expect 
subsequent benefits such as inheritance (Lucas and Stark 1985). Lucas and Stark find that 
remittances are larger to families with higher per capita incomes, to households with drought-
sensitive assets during dry periods and to those who have provided their daughters with higher 
levels of education. This supports the idea that in the case of daughters remittances are in part 
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repayment for schooling expenses, while in the case of sons remittances go to families with 
larger inheritable livestock herds. 
The work of Hoddinott (1994) on rural-urban migration in Kenya builds on a unitary 
household model. Hoddinott’s model only takes into account sons and parents. His main 
argument is that daughters usually migrate for marriage or for studies. According to 
Hoddinott, sons are the ones who involve in labour migration and send remittances to their 
family.   
Another paper by Agesa and Kim (2001) equally develops a household decision model of 
migration applied to Kenya. They test the split model against the joint migration model. Their 
approach is based on an intertemporal expected utility model. They consider that men can 
either migrate alone or with the entire family placing the emphasis on the psychic cost of 
separation. In their model, women can only be tied movers. The interest of an intertemporal 
migration model lies in the fact that it allows for the family to be reunited at a later stage. 
Even if initially, only the husband migrates adopting a split migration strategy, he may be 
joined later by the rest of the family transforming this split migration into a joint family 
migration.  
The framework of these models is the unitary approach to the household. The unitary 
household model relies on the assumption that husbands and wives maximize jointly a 
common utility function under the common household budget constraint. Preferences are 
exogenous and aggregated across family members. Household resources are entirely pooled. 
Each household member is considered to have an equal weight in the household utility 
function. In particular, some family members sacrifice their own income earning potential 
knowing that they would be compensated for by sharing rules which allow them to benefit 
from overall higher household earnings. Therefore these models are not very adequate to 
study gender migration.  
Recent developments of household migration models 
More recent papers take into account cooperative models of the intra-household decision 
making process. For example, Chen et al. (2006, 2007) consider the migration decision in the 
context of a cooperative model of intra-household bargaining with long-run renegotiation 
arrangements. The key assumption of the model is the possibility of renegotiation. If the 
marriage contract is renegotiable, the wage increase that migrant women are likely to 
experience at destination would improve their bargaining position inside the household. On 
the other hand, if renegotiation is not feasible, women can be negatively affected, as the ex-
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ante arrangement is no longer optimal for the spouse who experiences a wage increase 
requiring on his behalf a higher market effort for a comparatively lower surplus. They test 
their model on German data and find that renegotiation opportunities are weak for migrant 
women. Although women may financially benefit from migration, this is not due to an 
improvement in labour market opportunities, but sooner to an increase in their market effort, 
with little relief from domestic work, thus leading to an amplification of their burden. 
Another recent paper by Gemici (2007) equally analyses the migration decision in a 
cooperative Nash-bargaining household model comparing joint and split migration decisions. 
The threat point is the value of divorce. Upon divorce, individuals make employment and 
migration decisions as single agents. The household bargaining process provides the 
mechanism by which costs or gains from relocation are shared between spouses. When the 
costs borne by one of the spouses are too high relative to the gains from marriage or his/her 
partner’s gains from relocation, the couple divorce. The results obtained by Gemici show that 
when joint family migration occurs the spouse who benefits from household migration in 
terms of labour market outcomes are the husbands. Women are in this case the ‘trailing’ 
spouse. Moreover, when single, men are able to take best advantage of the different job 
opportunities across locations. At the same time, when single, women have higher wages. 
Our paper relies on a similar approach as these last papers considering the possibility of split 
or joint temporary migration of the spouses. 
 
4. Theoretical model  
Our framework is the collective household model. The collective household model was 
developed first by Chiappori (1988, 1992), Bourguignon et al. (1993), Browning et al. (1994), 
Browning and Chiappori (1998). In this approach, the household is modelled as a two-person 
economy. Each individual has distinct utility functions that she maximizes subject to different 
budget constraints. The decision process regarding consumption and labour supply leads to a 
Pareto-efficient resource allocation. This model was extended to take into account household 
production and household consumption patterns. 
The collective household model has two different lines of application. The first line analyses 
the implications of this model for household consumption, whereas the second line of 
application deals with its importance for labour market outcomes of the household members 
and especially time allocation. Household models were only recently developed to take into 
account household production as first advocated by Apps and Rees (1997). However, Apps 
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and Rees (1997) and Chiappori (1997) show that in the case of household production of a 
non-marketable domestic good the derivatives of the sharing rule are not retrievable and the 
model cannot be identified. On the other hand, Bourguignon (1999), considering children as a 
public consumption good shows that the sharing rule can be identified up to a constant. 
Consequently, this allows for an analysis of how individual budgets change if the household 
budget constraint changes. Several more recent studies have equally taken into account the 
effect of children on the consumption pattern and on the labour supply of family members. 
Models by Apps and Rees (2002), Chiappori, Blundell and Meghir (2004), Bargain and Donni 
(2007) follow this line of thought.  
Collective household models have so far taken into account mainly on the time dimension, 
considering the bargaining process to be directly linked to the allocation of time by family 
members. Like recent models developed by Chen et al. (2005 and 2007), Gemici (2007) our 
model focuses on the spatial dimension of the bargaining process.  
Assumption 1 In order to simplify our model we consider that the household is made up of 
two decision makers. Other persons in the household are also considered, but these persons do 
not have bargaining power. Each individual is characterized by her own preferences.  
Assumption 2 The members consume a composite private good Ci but they also derive utility 
from the existence of a household public good G (children). 
μ Ui + (1 − μ ) Uj 
Ui,j represents the utility of the husband and respectively the wife, μ is the Pareto weight 
attached to each member’s preference, comprised between 0 and 1. μ is called the 
“distribution of power” index (Browning and Chiappori 1998) and captures the household 
decision-making process and its result. It can be a function of prices, income, individual 
heterogeneity in preferences and, eventually, distribution factors. 
Assumption 3 The utility function has the standard Walrasian properties. It is strictly quasi-
concave, increasing and twice-differentiable. Each member is endowed with direct 
preferences on her own leisure and consumption.  
We write an egoistic utility function: 
Ui (Ci, G)   
Assumption 4 We consider the utility function to be separable with respect to public 
consumption: 
Ui= Wi [Ui (Ci), G] 
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Assumption 5  We consider as in Chiappori et al. (2004) that the public good, that is children, 
requires both investment in consumption and production. The price of the public domestic 
good is likely to be endogenous and specific to each household. 
The public good is produced with a constant returns to scale technology using two 
complementary inputs: Z and time input of the mother hj. The production function is strictly 
increasing, twice-differentiable and concave.  
G= f (Z, hj) 
Assumption 6 Following Apps and Rees (2002) we consider Z to be a normal consumption 
good as part of the composite good C: 
C=Ci + Cj +Z 
The price of the consumption good is set to unity. 
Assumption 7 For simplicity, we do not consider leisure. In this case, the woman divides her 
time between market labour and household production, whereas the man works only in the 
labour market so his time is supplied entirely in the labour market. There is specialization 
inside the household like in the traditional Becker (1991) model, but this specialization is not 
complete. The woman has a higher productivity than the man in domestic production and is 
the one to specialize in the production of the domestic public good. However, she also works 
in the labour market. 
The woman’s market labour supply is:   
                                                             tj=Tj- hj , where Tj is the woman’s total time endowment 
The man’s market labour supply is:  
                                                                       Ti=  ti 
 
Assumption 8 (the Pareto efficiency assumption) The Pareto efficiency assumption implies 
the efficiency of the collective decision process which, in the case of the collective household 
model, supposes the existence of a sharing rule.  
However, the sharing rule in itself is not equivalent to efficiency. The sharing rule depends on 
the income of the two members and on distribution factors (si). Income is usually considered 
to be made of labour and non-labour income. We simplify the framework and consider that 
the family budget is made up only of labour income (wi and wj). The sharing rule is 
conditional on the first step decision of domestic good consumption. In this case, the sharing 
rule depends directly on the income earned on the labour market and not on non-labour 
income. However, as the labour income is endogenous, the sharing rule will also be 
endogenous. 
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       Φ (wi, wj, …si….)   
We set a dummy dm = 1 if the individual migrates and to zero otherwise. The household 
members face the following possible migration strategies: 
(1) The husband migrates: 
m
i
m
j
m
i UdU ⋅= (knowing that j migrates) + (1- mjd ) miU ' (knowing that j does not migrate) 
(2) The husband does not migrate: 
nm
i
m
j
nm
i UdU ⋅= (knowing that j migrates) + (1- mjd ) nmiU ' (knowing that j does not migrate) 
A similar set of strategies is available for the wife.  
(1) If the wife migrates: 
m
j
m
i
m
j UdU ⋅=  (knowing that i migrates) + (1- mid ) mjU ' (knowing that i does not migrate) 
(2) If the wife does not migrate: 
nm
j
m
i
nm
j UdU ⋅= (knowing that i migrates) + (1- mid ) nmjU ' (knowing that j does not migrate) 
We consider nmm pp ,  to be the prices of the composite good at destination and respectively in 
the home country, nmi
m
i ww , the expected wage at destination and the wage in the home 
country, τ  the migration cost and nmimi ΦΦ ,  the sharing rules when i migrates and respectively 
when i does not migrate.  
Assumption 9 We consider that only women raise children.  
Consequence Therefore, if the mother leaves children are left with other females in the 
household. In this case we consider ej to be the time input in household production by other 
females in the household and γ  to be a productive efficiency parameter as we assume that the 
mother has the highest productivity in domestic production.  
G= G ( ))1( j
m
jj
m
j hded −+γ  
Assumption 10  Upon migrating the Pareto weights (the distribution of power) of the spouses 
change as the bargaining power of the woman increases with income ( nmj
m
j μμ > ) 2F3F1. Still, 
                                                 
1 Note that there is anthropological and sociological evidence that a woman's actual contribution to the 
household budget influences how much say she has in household decision making. Even though due to the fact 
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intra-household resource allocation is optimal as there is bargaining on the surplus obtained 
from migration ( nmm ww − ).   
Consequence: Though by migrating the wife’s labour income goes up and so the Pareto 
weight changes in her favour generating a disutility for her husband, this might still be upset 
by a high surplus obtained from migration so that in the end there is net gain for the husband 
(Lundberg and Pollack 2003). 
Assumption 11 Following Vijverberg (1993), we consider the wage at destination to be 
determined by mir  which is the average market determined productivity, by individual 
characteristics ez and by a random component miε .    
m
i
em
i
m
i zrww ε+= ),(~  
The utility maximization program writes: 
Max [ nmi
m
i
m
i
m
i UdUd )1( −+ ] 
s.t. jj uu ≥  
])[1(][ nmi
nmm
i
m
i
mm
i CpdCpd −++η nmimimimi dd Φ−+Φ≤ )1(  
G= G ( ))1( j
m
jj
m
j hded −+γ , where γ  is a productive efficiency parameter 
jj ee ≤  
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We then write the first order conditions of the model: 
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We derive the following Marshallian demands for consumption: 
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iii ΦΦ= τ  
                                                                                                                                                        
that the woman works in the household her husband is able to supply labour on the market and earn a wage, she 
will not have as much power as she would if she earned it herself (Mencher, 1988, Riley, 1998). 
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In the case of women we have a similar system of Marshallian demands: 
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Marshallian demands have the usual properties of demand functions. They are homogenous of 
degree zero and convex in prices and incomes.  
The next step is to substitute the consumption bundles in the utility function. For the optimal 
consumption bundle we obtain the indirect utility function. The optimal consumption choices, 
or the demand, depend on prices and income. Indirect utility functions are homogeneous of 
degree zero, nonincreasing in prices and strictly increasing in income, quasiconvex and 
continuous. 
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and respectively: 
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As set forward by Pollack and Wachter (1975) we replace G with the inputs used to produce 
it. 
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The migration decision of women depends on the shadow value of children, whereas the men 
take G as set. The fact that women are involved in domestic production leads to an increase in 
their opportunity cost of migrating. This cost is likely to be specific to each household, 
depending on the shadow value allocated to children. This value is completely endogenous in 
the case where women do not work in the labour market.  
Assumption 12: In our model we assume that women work on the labour market. 
Consequence:  
If the woman does not migrate the shadow value of children depends on her market wage: 
)(* nmjwp  
If the woman migrates the shadow value of children depends on the expected wage at 
destination as well as on the availability of other household members that could substitute the 
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woman in taking care of the children and on the productivity of these members in child 
rearing. 
),,(* γjmj ewp  
Whereas domestic production is exogenously given in the case of men, it is binding in that of 
women. 
At the same time, the sharing rule is conditional on income and distribution factors: 
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Usually, the sharing rules can be identified at the best up to a constant. In our model the ex-
post sharing rule is linked to the ex-ante sharing rule (see Appendix III). We do not really care 
if the sharing rules are identified or not. The focus of our model does not lie on the sharing 
rule in itself, our interest lies sooner with the distribution of power inside the household 
(Browning and Gørtz 2006), which as the sharing rule is likely to be influenced by existing 
norms in society. Moreover, the distribution of power is a much broader concept than the 
sharing rule as it also refers to preferences on consumption. 
However in our model, both sharing rules and the distribution of power are endogenous. What 
does an endogenous distribution of power mean? We consider that labour income directly 
affects the distribution of power as argued by Basu (2006). In turn, labour income depends 
directly on time allocated to the labour market. Women would have the incentive to allocate 
more time to the labour market in order to raise their intra-household power and less time to 
leisure and domestic production than Pareto optimal. The household can reach in this case a 
suboptimal equilibrium with women spending less time in domestic production (Iyigun and 
Walsh 2007).  
Assumption 13 There exists a social norm such that ≥jh jh  In this case the time supplied to 
domestic production is set by the social norm and cannot fall below the level of jh 3F4F
2. 
Household domestic supply is bounded from below by the social code of behaviour.  
Consequence: Therefore, the time supplied to market labour can be written as  jh  −jT . 
 
                                                 
2 Burda et al. (2007) consider a similar model but with leisure fixed by the social norm. 
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If norms are binding, the existence of social norms may impede women from allocating more 
time to the labour market as there is a cost of deviating from the commonly accepted norm 
and thus restore the Pareto optimal equilibrium. In this way, the Pareto efficiency assumption 
can be respected even when power distribution is endogenous. In our model the existence of 
social norms may lead to a Pareto efficient equilibrium to the detriment of women as opposed 
to the model set forth by Iyigun and Walsh (2007) who consider that the equilibrium could be 
restored following intra-household Coasian transfers. With higher levels of education for 
women and thus higher labour income and with Coasian intra-household transfers a Pareto 
optimal equilibrium can be attained which makes women better-off. 
Assumption 14:  A disrespect of the norm induces a cost S which depends on the time shifted 
from the production of the domestic good towards market labour ** jjj hht −= and on θ, where 
θ is the proportion of persons in the economy who disobey the norm or the disobeyers.  
Consequence: ),( * θjtS is the social cost or the cost of the social stigma.  
Assumption 15: The social stigma induces a decrease in the woman’s Pareto weight. 
Consequence Although the rise in the woman’s income increases her Pareto weight, this 
increase could be upset by the social stigma and women could end up worse-off. The social 
stigma undermines the woman’s “say” in the household.  
Assumption 16: In addition, a disrespect of the norm also triggers a decrease in the utility 
level which passes through the production of G. As mothers shift their time from domestic 
production towards market labour they will be substituted in domestic production by other 
women in the household. This cost is represented by γ the productive efficiency parameter of 
other women in the household which is lower than the mother’s.  
Consequence: The total cost has two different components: a social cost equal to the stigma 
cost and another cost which could also be termed as a psychological cost of being less 
involved in the production of children which generates a disutility according to γ. 
Following assumption 4, we rewrite the woman’s utility function as follows: 
                 Uj= Wj [Uj (Cj), G, S], where S is the stigma cost 
In this case the utility maximization programme becomes: 
Max.  Wj [Uj (Cj), G, S] = Uj (Cj) + G ),( jj he γ  - ),( * θjtS  
             t.s.   πγ +≤− jj wGc , where  π = jj ww −*  
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Assumption 17: Whereas Uj (Cj) and G ),( jj he γ  have the above mentioned 
properties, ),( * θjtS is increasing in *jt  and decreasing in θ .  
Consequence ,0* <
jt
Sθ  which means that the marginal disutility from shifting time to labour 
market is decreasing in the total amount in the economy of women who shift time from 
domestic production to the labour market and do so by breaking the norm.  
S(0,θ) = 0. If women respect the norm, the cost is zero indifferently on the rate of women 
who do not respect the norm. 
0)~,( * =θjtS ,   1~0 ≤<< θθ For high levels of θ the stigma cost falls to zero as in Akerloff’s 
model on social custom (1980).  
At equilibrium the marginal benefit of an extra unit of female labour supplied in the labour 
market, measured in terms of utility from extra consumption, equals the marginal cost, given 
by the stigma as a function of individual labour supply on the foreign labour market and the 
migration rate as well as of the disutility incurred by shifting child production to other less 
productive persons. 
The decision whether to migrate or not, M will depend in this case on the difference in labour 
incomes, the availability and productive efficiency of other female persons in the household 
(according to assumption 9) and on the migration rate of women in the home community m.  
M ),,,,,( meww j
nm
j
m
j γτ  
Hence, the agent considers the wage rates and the expected level of the migration rate in the 
economy, m, in order to optimally choose whether to migrate or not.  
Assumption 18: Women care about children production and about the cost of stigma, 
consequently women’s migration will occur only for very high income inequalities between 
the home country and the country of destination and of very low gains in the home country. 
                      Let c be a subsistence level of consumption for which cwnmj <  
Consequence In particular, if in the home country the reservation income is very low so that 
consumption falls below subsistence level, women would have the incentive to migrate in 
spite of their involvement in domestic production and of the existence of the social norm. In 
fact, production of children also requires investment in consumption good Z as stated in 
assumption five. Women would not be able to provide for their children anymore and to 
finally produce the domestic good as jh  and Z are complements.  
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Assumption 19: The response of the agents to the expected migration rate generates multiple 
rational expectations equilibria. Expectations regarding women’s migration rate in the 
economy affect each individual's decision and thus the outcome, giving way to multiple 
equilibria as the woman's expectation of m determines the expected stigma cost she will face. 
Let us assume first that the stigma cost function is such that the optimal female labour supply, 
as a function of the expected aggregate level of female labour shift from domestic production 
to the labour market, is S-shaped4F5F3.  
 
Figure 2                      Female labour supply with multiple equilibria 
A θ 
                                                                     θ 
Consequence:  
There are four cases out of which two are the extreme cases: 
(1) The woman supplies her entire time endowment to domestic production and does not 
work on the labour market so that jj hh > and as *jt =0, then ),( * θjtS = ),0( θS  so there 
is no stigma cost. 
(2) The woman obeys the norm and supplies to the labour market jh  −jT then as again 
*
jt =0, ),(
* θjtS = ),0( θS  so there is no stigma cost. 
                                                 
3 Evidence on the S-shaped form of the women’s labour supply is found in several articles. See for example 
Fogli and Veldkamp (2007). 
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(3) The woman disobeys the norm and her time supply on the labour market exceeds the 
norm by ** jjj hht −= . In this case the stigma cost is ),( * θjtS , depending on *jt , the 
amount of time by which jh  falls and on the proportion of people who disobey the 
norm θ . 
(4) The woman disobeys the norm and her entire time endowment is supplied on the 
labour market so that 0=jh  and *jt is maximum. The stigma cost will be maximum if 
θ =0.  In this case ),( * θjtS = )0,( *jtS .  
The case when the woman migrates is the extreme case (4) in which the woman supplies her 
entire time on the foreign labour market. In this case the stigma cost will depend on *jt which 
is maximum and m, the migration rate of women in the community. Note that for high levels 
of m the cost decreases significantly. 
This is equivalent to assuming that there exists an 10 ≤≤ θ  such that: 
 1~ if 02~
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 and  ,~0 if  02~
*2 '
≤<<≤≤> θθ
θ
θθ
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j
td
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j
td
, 
which is equivalent to implying that   1~ if 0~ and  ~0 if0~ ≤<>≤≤< θθθθθθ )S''( )S''( .  
At low migration rates in the economy, a reduction in the migration rate would increase the 
stigma cost at an increasing rate. Also, at high levels of m, an increase in m would reduce the 
stigma cost at an increasing rate.   
Assumption 20 There exists a threshold level m~  above which the norm is not binding 
anymore.  
Consequence: In this case we can write the utility function as follows: 
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When in the home economy the proportion of migrants equals m~ , there is no stigma cost 
anymore and the only cost incurred by migrating besides the physical cost passes by γ5F6F4. 
Assumption 21 There exists a second threshold level m~~ above which migration becomes 
itself a social norm. 
Consequence:  We write the following utility function: 
                                                 
4 This is in accordance to the critical mass model developed by Schelling (1978) and Granovetter (1978). 
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We have multiple steady states with multiple equilibira. Note that in this case we are at a 
norm stable equilibrium. The equilibrium reached is set by the norm. Income does not play 
any part in the migration decision except for allowing to cover for the physical migration cost, 
so income differentials are no more the main mechanism to trigger migration. This explains 
why migration occurs even with wage equalization between the sending and the receiving 
regions and why in reality we do not observe an evolution of migration rates as predicted by 
the hump migration theory (Martin 1993).   
 
Figure 3                         The evolution of migration rates 
 
 
As there is a cost of disrespect of the norm, everybody will have the incentive to migrate 
provided that they can cover the physical cost of migrating. Furthermore, as more and more 
people migrate and networks develop, migration costs fall and more people can afford to 
migrate reinforcing the social norm in a cumulative dynamic process.  
Depending on the main determinants that trigger migration, we can actually distinguish two 
types of migration:  
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(1) The first type of migration occurs when the migration rate is below m~~ . In this case, 
income is the main incentive to migrate. Therefore, the type of migration that takes 
place when the rate of migration is below m~~ is an income-seeking migration.  
(2) The second type of migration occurs when the migration rate is above m~~ .  In this case 
reputation is the main incentive to migrate. Therefore, the type of migration that takes 
place when the rate of migration is above m~~ could be termed as a social status-seeking 
migration. 
After this incursion into the role played by norms in women’s migration decision we return to 
our model and integrate the findings.  
Following assumption 10 the wife’s migration decision is also optimal for her spouse. 
At this stage we can write the migration equation as a labour supply function on the foreign 
labour market: 
      M ),,,,,,( Gwwpp nmi
m
i
nmm μτ  
In the case of men this equation becomes: 
     M ),,,,,,( τnmjmjnmiminmm wwwwpp  
Whereas in the case of women it writes: 
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The random component in the wage equation allows us to pass to a random utility 
maximization model as advocated by Block and Marschak (1960) and McFadden (1973). 
Under the additive separability assumption, the initial model becomes: 
 nmnmmmnmm VVVVVV μμ +++=⇒+= ~~  
In our model the implementation of the RUM leads to the following relationship for indirect 
utility: 
++−= mjmjjmjmmimmiminmiminmmi hdedwpVdGwwppV μγλτλτ )],)1(,,,,,(~[),,,,,,( ,  
                                                μγλτ +−−+ )],)1(,,,,,(~)1( , jmjjmjnmnminmnmimi hdedwpVd nm 
In the case of women: 
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We then maximize with respect to mid  : 
Pr ( mid =1) = Pr (
nm
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In the case of women we maximize with respect to mjd  : 
Pr ( mjd =1) = Pr (
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5. Econometric Model 
Our model is based on a simultaneous equations system in which the decisions of the two 
spouses are interlinked. However, as set forth by Greene (2003) we have chosen to ignore the 
simultaneity of the model and implement a bivariate probit technique.  
The bivariate probit model allows to correct for the correlation in error terms in the two 
distinct regressions. By taking into account the correlation between the error terms we can 
determine the simultaneous effect of unobserved individual characteristics on the migration 
decision of men and on that of women. 
The migration decisions of women and men are modelled simultaneously: 
P( mid =1) =  ),( HZiΨ  
P( mjd =1) =  ),,( NHZ jΨ  
where   mid =1  and 
m
jd =1 denote a positive outcome of the migration decision of each spouse 
              Z is a vector of personal characteristics 
              H  is a vector of household characteristics 
              N is a vector of norms 
We write the following system of equations: 
 
P( mid ) =  HZi 21 ββ + + 1ε  
P( mjd ) =  2
'
3
'
2
'
1 εβββ +++ NHZ j  
 
For simplicity we pose:  
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where error terms are independently and identically distributed as bivariate normal with 
Var( 1ε ) = Var( 2ε ) = 1. The interdependence between the migration decision of the husband 
and that of his spouse is captured by the correlation coefficient: Corr( i1ε , i2ε  ) = ρ.  
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There are four possible regimes in our model:    
 
(1) neither of the spouses migrates: }{ }{ );,(,0,0 2'1'2'21'121 ρεε bxbxxbxbxPxyyP iiiiiiiiii −Φ=−≤−≤===  
 
(2) only the wife migrates: }{ }{ );,(,1,0 2'1'2'21'121 ρεε −−Φ=≤−−≤=== bxbxxbxbxPxyyP iiiiiiiiii  
 
(3) only the husband migrates: }{ }{ );,(,0,1 2'1'2'21'121 ρεε −−Φ=−≤<−=== bxbxxbxbxPxyyP iiiiiiiiii  
 
(4) both spouses migrate: }{ }{ );,(,1,1 2'1'2'21'121 ρεε bxbxxbxbxPxyyP iiiiiiiiii Φ=<−<−===  
 
6. Descriptive Statistics and Variables 
We employ a dataset of 2.137.967 individuals and 732016 households which represents a 
10% randomly selected sample of the Romanian 2002 census developed by the Romanian 
National Institute of Statistics6F7F5. The census was conducted in March 2002 at a time when 
Romanians had just obtained the right to freely circulate in the Schengen area without needing 
a visa. The database contains over 841,000 people working on the labour market out of which 
12,000 international temporary labour migrants. We have in total 8825 migrant men and 3808 
migrant women filtered by the location of the workplace and duration of absence. 
Unfortunately, as we do not have panel data, our study is in cross-section. 
There are several limitations at the level of our database as the census is not conceived to 
study international migration. Our database contains household and individual level data, 
however we do not have indications about the migrants’ destinations, nor about the initial 
income level of the households. The choice of our dataset was due mainly to the importance 
                                                 
5 Data were provided by the Minnesota Population Center. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series - 
International: Version 3.0. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2007. 
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of the sample. No other available sample on Romanian migration would have provided us 
with such an important number of migrants. Gender-based research on migration has been 
hampered by the lack of available data. Samples on international migration which are 
representative when used to study overall migration become too small when divided by 
gender. The size of our sample provides us the opportunity for an in-depth look at gender 
difference in migration. Our study is likely to be significant at the regional and national level.  
Table I Descriptive statistics individual level variables 
Men Women 
All International  
migrants 
All International 
migrants 
Variables 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 36.109 21.306 32.004 8.961 38.705 22.299 30.098 8.760 
Education 8.891 4.017 10.290 3.239 7.802 3.954 9.762 3.372 
Married 0.498 0.500 0.557 0.497 0.474 0.499 0.501 0.500 
Single 0.408 0.491 0.389 0.488 0.317 0.465 0.378 0.485 
Child of head 0.366 0.482 0.428 0.495 0.268 0.443 0.420 0.494 
Spouse 0.008 0.092 0.025 0.156 0.402 0.490 0.300 0.458 
 
Table I presents the descriptive statistics of individual level variables for migrant men and 
women as compared to the overall population of men and women. In our sample, both 
migrant men and women are younger than the average population with migrant women being 
on average younger than men. While the average gap is four years in the case of men, in the 
case of women it is twice as important. The average age for migrant men is thirty-two, 
whereas for women it is thirty. Men are on average better educated than women, but both 
migrant women and men are better educated than the average population. Contrary to 
expectations, marriage rates are higher in the ranks of migrants than of overall population. 
Half of the migrant women are married and 55% of their male counterparts are also married. 
However, almost 38% of the migrant women are single compared to almost 32% of the 
overall women population. Over 40% of the migrants are children of the household head and 
30% of the migrant women are wives of the household head. 
On the foreign labour market most of the migrant men are employed as craft workers in 
industry (47,3%) as menial in industry (15,6%) and as blue collars in agriculture (10%), 
whereas on the Romanian labour market, men work mostly as craft workers in industry 
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(10,1%) and as blue collars in agriculture (11%). Meanwhile, migrant women are employed 
as menial in private services (60%), as blue collars in agriculture (9,7%) and as craft workers 
in industry (7,7%) (see Appendix IV). 
Professions are very sex-specific and the foreign labour market for migrants seems to be 
highly segmented. The demand is very gender specific driving women into some specific 
occupations and men into others.   
 
Table II Descriptive statistics household level variables 
Men Women 
All International  
migrants 
All International  
migrants 
Variables 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
 Household size 3.849 1.790 4.113 1.768 3.695 1.832 4.002 1.807
Children < 5 years 0.249 0.559 0.227 0.505 0.246 0.555 0.168 0.432
Children  5-10 years 0.257 0.557 0.249 0.538 0.253 0.553 0.229 0.530
Children 10-15 years 0.349 0.649 0.323 0.627 0.338 0.640 0.294 0.593
Other dependants 0.674 0.877 0.593 0.785 0.655 0.874 0.419 0.701
Gender ratio 0.424 0.175 0.434 0.179 0.600 0.203 0.597 0.197
Education of head 9.462 4.069 10.435 3.224 7.177 4.130 9.718 3.376
Wealth index 5.460 3.514 5.501 3.508 5.593 3.515 5.864 3.504
Rural 0.488 0.500 0.512 0.500 0.469 0.499 0.458 0.498 
 
Migrants also come from larger and wealthier households than the overall population. Migrant 
men come from slightly larger households than migrant women, whereas migrant women 
come from slightly wealthier households than migrant men. Also, the percentage of migrant 
men coming from rural regions is more important than that of migrant women. Only 45,8% of 
migrant women come from rural areas compared to more than half of migrant men. Both in 
the case of men and in that of women, migrants come from households that have on average 
less dependants, being they young or old than in the case of the overall male and female 
population. The difference is particularly important in the case of migrant women with small 
dependant children under the age of five. 
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Migrant men come from households with a larger share of women than the average and both 
migrant men and women come from households with better educated heads than the average 
level of education of household heads. In the case of migrant women the household head has 
on average two additional years of education compared to the average level of education of 
households heads, whereas in the case of men household heads have on average one 
additional year of education than the average education of household heads.  
At the regional level, the main sending regions seem to be the same for migrant women as for 
migrant men. The most important sending regions are: Vrancea (SE), Suceava, Bacau (NE), 
Satu Mare and Maramures (NV) as in the case of the overall population (Sandu et al. 2004).  
Figure 4 
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Source : own computations based on the  2002 Census and on data provided by Sandu et. al. (2004) 
 
 
We analyze the impact on the propensity to migrate of women on three levels: individual, 
familial, and societal as advocated by the 1995 UN Report on Women and Migration. 
 
Individual level variables 
We will first take into account individual level variables. We consider for the start the 
standard Mincerian variables: age, age squared, age3, education, status in the household and 
marital status. 
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In human capital studies, as wages are endogenous the proxies for expected economic gains 
from migration are typically measured as an individual’s total years of schooling and work 
experience. Work experience which is usually either proxied by age or computed as the 
difference between age and years spent in education is a key determinant of earnings in 
human capital models (Sjaastad, 1962, Mincer, 1974, Vijverberg 1993). Age captures the 
biological age and at the same time experience. Younger people are more prone to migrate as 
they would have a longer period over which to recover the migration cost (Harris and Todaro 
1970). Younger people are also less risk-averse and therefore are more inclined to take the 
risk of migrating. Furthermore, they are less rooted in the society of origin and the 
psychological cost of migration is reduced. But, as age might have a more complex effect, we 
also control for age squared and age3. Kanaiaupuni (2000) found that rural Mexican men are 
more likely to migrate than women except after fifty. She explains this finding by arguing that 
women often migrate to reunite with family members or to join their husbands abroad once 
their children are older.  
Most studies of migration determinants have found that the level of education achieved by 
migrants is higher than the level achieved by nonmigrants and that additional years of 
schooling favour migration (Winters et al. 2001, Mora and Taylor 2006). However, the 
influence of education on migration depends on the economic returns of schooling in both the 
sending and the receiving areas (Markle and Zimmermann 1992). Several studies show that 
the influence of education on the decision to migrate differs with respect to gender. For 
example, Mora and Taylor (2006) found no effect of education on international migration 
from Mexico, whereas Kanaiaupuni (2000) found a positive effect in the case of women. 
According to Pfeiffer et al. (2007) gender could be the key variable to explain this 
contradiction.  
The civil status variable should capture differences in migration behaviour according to the 
civil status. Mincer (1978) considers that family ties deter migration and married persons are 
less likely to migrate. This was confirmed in the case of women by Cackley (1993) and 
Kanaiaupuni (2000) who found that single women are more likely to migrate than married 
women. We also take into account a detailed version of the civil status variable.  
We then consider the relationship to the household head. More specifically, we test if the 
migrants are sons and daughters of the household head. As pointed out by Hoddinott (1994) 
and by Goerlich and Trebsch (2005) those more prone to migrate are direct relatives of the 
household head.  
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Last, we control for the mother tongue. In this case, our assumption is that Romanian 
citizens that have a mother tongue other than Romanian are at least bilingual which could be 
an advantage for them on the labour market both of the home and of the foreign country. It is 
the case of the Hungarian and German minorities in Transylvania which represented a large 
part of Romanian migration at the beginning of the 1990s. 
 
Labour market variables 
Furthermore, we consider occupations and employment sectors as the migration decision is 
likely to be influenced by labour market opportunities. Migrants might be selected according 
to occupations (Mora and Taylor 2006). At the same time, the types of jobs typically obtained 
at destination also influence migration patterns between genders as employers match women 
and men with specific jobs and occupations. As King and Zontini (2000) show the increase in 
women migration to Southern Europe can be linked to an increase in jobs in the service and 
informal sectors.  
Following, Constant and Zimmermann (2003) we have proceeded at an aggregation of ISCO 
occupations that we have crossed with the main sectors of employment (see Appendix VI). 
This procedure allows us to isolate the influence of professions by sector of activity. On the 
one hand, these variables capture individual skills and on the other hand they give a precise 
picture of the labour market activities and of how migrants may be matched with specific jobs 
in specific sectors.  
 
Household level variables 
A third group of variables captures household characteristics. We consider a very detailed 
structure of the household as women’s migration is more linked to the structure of the family 
(UN 1995). We analyze the following variables: the household size, the number of children 
by age groups, the number of other elderly dependants, the gender ratio in the household, the 
average education of other women in the household and the average age of other women in 
the household. Moreover, we equally control for the level of wealth, house ownership and if 
the household is in a rural region or not. 
The size of the household may have either a positive or a negative effect. On the one hand, if 
potential migrants are important sources of labour, large household size may deter them from 
leaving. On the other hand, if migration is in part a strategy to place surplus labour from the 
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household on the external labour market, larger households are likely to have higher rates of 
migration (Lewis 1954).  
Considering gender roles, the number of children in the household is expected to have a 
negative effect on women’s migration and a positive effect for male migration (Kanaiaupuni 
2000). We take into account also the age of children as studies have found that while early 
marriage and child bearing discourage women’s migration, elder children and extended 
family members encourage women’s mobility (Kanaiaupuni 2000). 
Gender ratio should encourage women’s migration as in this case there are relatively more 
people of their own gender who could substitute them in child rearing when they leave (Katz 
1999).  
We consider the mean age of other women in the household to be a proxy for their 
productivity (γ) in child rearing as if they are too young they may not be skilled enough to 
take care of the children and if they are too old they may not be efficient enough due to the 
age gap which impedes them, for example, to help children with school. 
We also consider the mean education of other women in the household as their level of 
education is also likely to influence their productivity in child rearing and at the same time 
more educated women are less likely to be influenced by traditional norms and could actually 
encourage the migration of another female person in the household.  
Since we do not have any indication on the income of the households, we built a Wealth 
Index as proposed by Katz (1999) and Mora and Taylor (2006) in which we include: the 
building material of the dwelling, the existence of sewage, water supply, kitchen, toilet and 
bathroom, central heating, hot water, air conditioning, gas and electricity (see Appendix VII).  
In addition we also consider if the migrant owns his dwelling or not. Donato (1993) and 
Cerruti and Massey (2001) found that land, home and business ownership decreased the 
probability of migration by women. 
In case of rich households, with high labour productivity of family members, other things 
being equal, these households are less likely to send members with similar human capital 
abroad than are asset poor households. If migration occurs in order to overcome risk and 
liquidity constraints, then wealthy households will have a lower propensity to send out 
migrants. On the other hand, if migration itself implies costs and risks for the household, a 
certain level of wealth may be required in order for the individual to be able to afford the 
costs of migrating. 
Last, we check whether the household is in a rural area or not, as studies show that migration 
patterns are likely to differ between urban and rural households. Most of the migration studies 
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done so far in Romania have focused only on the rural dimension, considering rural regions as 
the most important sending areas (IOM 2002). 
Norms 
First of all, by employing the National Gender Barometer run by the Gallup Foundation in 
2000, we built a gender norm index referring to the status of women in the household for 
each NUTS II region (see Appendices V and VIII).  We consider this to be a proxy for the 
norm regarding child production in our model. 
One of the main factors likely to determine the degree to which this social norm is binding is 
the level of education. As shown by Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) the better educated a woman 
is, the more likely she is to feel constrained by social norms. We consider that in the case of 
better educated women the norms are less binding. In other words, the belief in the norm 
erodes with the level of education. In order to test this hypothesis we build an interactive 
variable between norms and the women’s education level.  
 
Regional level variables 
We control for the migration rate of women at the NUTS III level. In the case of our model 
the migration rate is a proxy for the number of people who disobey the norm. It can also be 
conceived as a variable capturing the importance of networks.  
Finally, in order to check the robustness of our results we consider dummy variables for each 
of the NUTS II regions in Romania. These variables should also capture unobserved regional 
characteristics.  
 
7. Estimation Results  
The results of the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression7F8F6 clustered at the household 
level reveal the existing differences in the decision to migrate of men and women. We ran 
four regression models. In the first model we considered variables on civil status and number 
of children aggregated. This is our standard model. We ran than a second model with these 
variables disaggregated. In the third model we introduced the labour market variables. In 
order to test the robustness of the results we equally ran a fourth model with regional fixed 
effects. All the results are presented in Appendix I. Maximum likelihood coefficient estimates 
as well as marginal effects are reported. 
                                                 
6 All refresions were run on a 50% reduced sample by frequency-weighting technique. 
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The Wald test on the rho coefficient confirms that migration is a joint decision as the error 
terms of the two equations are correlated, however the most unlikely outcome out of the four 
possible strategies that we have taken into account is that of joint migration. This suggests 
that households in Romania recur mostly to split migration when it comes to temporary labour 
migration with only one of their members who migrates, either the husband or the wife. As 
the cost of migration is greater for an entire household this can provide an incentive to split 
the family, increasing the psychological cost of separation. On the other hand, this decision 
may also be part of a sequential strategy, with one of the spouses migrating first and the other 
following at a later stage.  
Comments on the regression results refer to results from model one in case of all variables 
except for extended definitions of civil status and of children where commented results come 
from model two, labour market variables where results refer to model three and regional level 
variables, case in which considered results come from model four. 
 
Individual level variables 
Age has a positive quadratic effect on the probability to migrate both in the case of men and 
women, increasing and then decreasing migration probability. We equally run a regression 
including the age3 term. For men the result was insignificant, however for women the effect 
was positive and significant at the level of 10%, meaning that the age effect in the case of 
women is increasing and then decreasing and then increasing again. 
Education has also a positive effect in the case of men’s migration with each supplementary 
year of education increasing the probability to migrate by 2,3 percentage points. When we 
check for a quadratic effect, the term is insignificant in the case of men. However, in the case 
of women education has a negative quadratic effect which means that better educated women 
have a lower probability to migrate, but still a basic level of education might be required in 
order to migrate8F9F7. Women who have completed lower secondary education are the most likely 
to migrate. A possible interpretation of this result is that formal human capital is more 
important for men to successfully enter destination labour markets.  
Marriage increases men’s probability to migrate by 15,4 percentage points and reduces that 
of women by 9,3 percentage points. Married women are less likely to migrate then married 
men. 
                                                 
7 Significant at the 10% level 
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Our second regression model in which we included an extended definition of the civil status 
variable shows that with respect to singles, married men are by 12,6 percentage points more 
likely to migrate and those living in a consensual union are also by 6,0 percentage points9F10F8 
more likely to migrate. Men in all the other categories are less likely to migrate than singles. 
For women, the only group with a higher propensity to migrate than singles are those who are 
divorced, who are by 8,3 percentage points more likely to migrate than single women. 
Married women, those living in consensual unions and widows have a lower migration 
probability than singles.         
This is in accordance with the gender roles played by men and women in the Romanian 
society. Once they get married or live in couples, women become involved in domestic 
production and consequently are less likely to migrate, whereas men have to provide for the 
household and need to look for sources of income. Divorced women may migrate more 
because they need to provide for their family.  
The relationship to the household head and the mother tongue are not significant in any of the 
regressions we ran. 
 
Labour market variables 
The fact of being employed as craft worker in industry increases men’s likelihood to 
migrate by 36,1 percentage points compared to those working as menials in industry. Those 
working as menial in agriculture are also by 24,0 percentage points more likely to migrate 
and those working as craft workers in private services are by 16,6 percentage points10F11F9 more 
likely to migrate than menials employed in industry. 
In the ranks of women, those working as menial in private services are 47,1 percentage 
points more likely to migrate than women employed as menials in industry. Also women 
employed as blue collars in agriculture and those employed as menial in agriculture are by 
15,1 percentage points and respectively 17,0 percentage points11F12F10 more likely to migrate than 
women who work as menials in industry.  
Our findings confirm the myth of the Romanian household maids in the Italian labour market 
and also explain why education has a quadratic effect on women’s likelihood to migrate as 
their position in the labour market does not require a high level of education. They equally 
explain the age3 effect we found as many elderly women come to work in the caring sector 
                                                 
8 significant at the 15% level 
9 Significant at the 1% level 
10 Significant at the level of 5% and respectively of 10% 
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once their children are already grown up. In this case their cost of migrating is reduced 
because they are not involved in child rearing at home anymore. 
 
Household level variables 
The size of the household has a negative effect in the case of men, decreasing their 
probability to migrate by 8,2 percentage points for each additional household member, 
whereas in the case of women household size has a quadratic effect first increasing their 
likelihood to migrate and then decreasing it. It seems that for large households, migrants are 
important sources of labour. In the case of women, a large household may provide substitutes 
in terms of household chores. At the same time, after a threshold is reached household size 
discourages women’s migration as the number of dependent persons grows the woman might 
have to look after the dependents. 
The number of children increases men’s probability to migrate with every additional child 
increasing their probability by 12,9 percentage points and contrary to our expectations also 
increasing that of women by 7,9 percentage points. We include in a second regression the 
number of children disaggregated by age groups. Our results prove that the only group that 
reduces the women’s likelihood to migrate is that of children under the age of five. Both 
groups of children aged between five and ten and respectively between ten and fifteen 
increase women’s migration probability. This is in accordance with the findings of 
Kanaiaupuni (2000). On one hand, this may suggest either that in terms of household chores 
substitution could begin at a very early age. In this case, even though children do not work on 
the labour market, they begin to work at very early ages in household domestic production. 
On the other hand, if households are poor and women need to provide for the household, they 
may choose to migrate as soon as children leave infanthood and are less dependent on their 
mother.  
The existence of other elderly dependants also increases the probability to migrate of both 
women and men, with each additional dependant increasing the likelihood of men by 12,6 
percentage points and that of women by 6,3 percentage points12F13F11. This result suggests that one 
of the reasons for which men and women migrate is to provide for the dependants. Migration 
is a strategy to alleviate the budget constraint. At the same time, elderly dependants could 
equally substitute men and women in terms of domestic production.  
                                                 
11 Significant at the 15% level 
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The gender ratio has a significant positive effect in the case of women’s migration with each 
additional woman increasing its likelihood by 21,9 percentage points, as women who stay 
behind can substitute in terms of tasks those who leave. In the case of men the effect is 
negative, decreasing their likelihood to migrate by 10,2 percentage points which may imply 
that there is no substitution between genders in terms of tasks. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that, given the gender division of labour, replacement workers of the migrant’s 
own sex must be available in order to free an individual up for migration (Katz 1998).  
The probability to migrate increases with the number of other migrants in the household. 
Each additional migrant increases the likelihood to migrate of men by 29,4 percentage points 
and that of women by 9,8 percentage points. Several members who migrate together could 
build a migration network which might reduce the cost of migration. Also, in this case the 
psychological cost of separation from family members is reduced.       
The average level of education of other women in the household is not significant. At the 
same time, the average age of other women in the household has a negative effect, each 
supplementary year of education reducing migration probability by 0,5 percentage points13F14F12. It 
seems that the quantity of women in the household who could substitute the one who migrates 
is more important than their quality. 
The wealth index has a positive significant effect for men and a negative effect for women. 
While in the case of men it seems that richer households are the ones who can afford to send 
migrant men and to be deprived by a labour source, in the case of women only poor 
households send migrant women. This seems to confirm our hypothesis that women migrate 
only at a very low level of wealth in the home economy. Women’s migration is in this case a 
strategy undertaken only by the very poor. At the same time, this result may imply that 
migration costs are larger in the case of men than in that of women.   
The rural origin has a positive effect on labour migration for both men and women, 
increasing men’s likelihood to migrate by 7,2 percentage points and that of women by 6,3 
percentage points14F15F13. Our result is in accordance with previous sociological studies on 
Romanian migration that find particularly high rates of temporary labour migration in the 
rural areas and in small towns and less in large urban areas (IOM (2002), Sandu (2005)) . 
House ownership equally increases the migration of men by 3,1 percentage points and that of 
women by 5,0 percentage points15F16F14. Our results are not consistent with the findings of Massey 
                                                 
12 Signicant at the 10% level. 
13 In the case of women significant only at the 10% level. 
14 Significant at the level of 10%. 
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and Cerutti (2001) according to which house ownership reduces women’s migration. This 
finding however does not come as a surprise. As proven by sociologists, Romanians may 
migrate in part precisely in order to gather money that they could later invest in their houses. 
Their home is their pride and also a mark of their social status in their community of origin 
(Lagrave and Diminescu 1999). 
 
Regional level variables 
The existence of norms regarding gender roles in a region has a negative effect on women’s 
propensity to migrate. Norms decrease women’s likelihood to migrate by 6,2 percentage 
points. The stronger the norm, the less likely are women to migrate. Women who come from 
regions where norms and traditions are powerful are less likely to migrate than women who 
come from more tolerant regions with respect to their role in society.  
The interactive variable between norms and the level of education is positive and significant 
at the 5% level suggesting that the better educated a woman is the more likely she is to 
migrate despite the existence of deterring social norms. This confirms our intuition that better 
educated women are less constrained by social norms in their decisions.  
The migration rate of women in the region has a positive influence on women’s likelihood 
to migrate, increasing their migration likelihood by 2,5 percentage points. This result suggests 
that there is a cumulative causation effect though it appears not to be very strong. 
The results for variables regarding NUTS II regions show that migrants coming from the 
South-East regions are by 14,3 percentage points in the case of men and by 18,0 percentage 
points in that of women more likely to migrate than those coming from the South region. As 
well, both men and women who come from the regions of North-East and of North-West have 
more chances to migrate than those from the South16F17F15. We find the expected geographical 
patterns with people from South-East and North-East which are the two NUTS II main 
sending regions having a higher propensity to migrate than people coming from the rest of the 
country.   
 
Conclusions  
Our study proves the existence of important differences between the decision to migrate of 
men and that of women. Whereas both men and women migrate when they are young, women 
also migrate at a later stage of their life cycle. Men have more chances to migrate when they 
                                                 
15 In the case of women all signicant at the 10% level. 
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are better educated, instead migrant women do not seem to be able to take advantage of higher 
levels of education. In their case, there are no returns to upper education when migrating. Men 
migrate more if they are married, whereas married women migrate less. At the same time, 
both migrate when there are a lot of dependants to provide for, though women with small 
dependant children under the age of five migrate less. Men who come from large households 
migrate less because they are needed as labour force at home. On the contrary, women who 
come from large households are more likely to migrate as there are other persons in the 
household who can substitute them in terms of chores. The gender ratio shows that the 
chances to migrate increase with the existence in the household of other persons of the same 
gender to take up the chores as women and men are not substitutes in terms of domestic 
activities. Also, migrate men come from households that have already reached a certain level 
of wealth, instead migrant women come from poor household and their migration seems to be 
the ‘last best-option’ of these households. These differences are in part shaped by the culture 
of the sending society, by traditions and customs in the home community and in part by 
market forces as the labour demand in the home and the host country.  
Norms that clearly define gender roles in the household are an impediment to female 
migration. The more traditional a society is, the less likely are women to migrate as the 
deviation from the norm induces a cost of lost reputation undermining their status and their 
“say” in the home community and even in their households. The lives and prospects of men 
and women are to a great extent shaped by these gender stereotypes. The existence of cultural 
norms can explain why women do not migrate even when interesting economic opportunities 
present. They are not acting irrationally, they are just being norm-obeyers, in Akerloff’s terms 
(1980), knowing that breaking the norm would trigger a cost and that sooner or later they 
would come back to the home community and have to bear this cost. At the same time, low 
gains in the home country which shrink consumption to the subsistence level and even 
endanger child rearing may drive women to break the norm.  
Finally, migration prospects are equally given by the structure of the demand on the foreign 
labour market that matches men and women to precise sectors and occupations. Most of the 
migrant men work in the building industry and most of the migrant women in the caring 
services which do not require a high level of education and also provide employment 
opportunities for elder women.  
Is the gender norm inherently bad? Is women migration always positive? Who gains and who 
loses out of women’s migration? Like any other process women’s migration triggers winners 
and losers. The gains out of women’s migration are not evenly distributed at the level of the 
 38
household. Women have a major role in child rearing and in the formation of human capital. 
Women are mothers and this status makes their contribution to the future of society beyond 
any doubt. Although, remittances sent by women are likely to be spent on children, children 
could still be the main losers as it takes more than money to produce them. Children are also 
produced with parental care. At the same time, the lack of opportunities in the home economy 
and the low income level leaves women with no other alternative than migration as children 
cannot be produced without money.  
Is there really women empowerment as a consequence of women migration? Do local norms 
in the home community change in favour of women?  Do they gain a better social status?  
These are still open questions that need to be addressed.     
Although, our model is restrictive in many senses: by considering only two individuals and to 
some extent the home community and its empirical specification must still be developed, our 
main aim was to shed some light on the gender differences in the decision to migrate. We 
conclude that studies on the determinants of migration should be more sensitive to gender 
differences and take into account that “birds of passage are also women” (Morokvasic 1984). 
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Appendix I 
 
(1) (2) 
Men Women Men Women 
 
Variables 
Coefficient Marginal 
effects 
Coefficient Marginal 
effects 
Coefficient Marginal 
effects 
Coefficient Marginal 
effects 
Individual characteristics         
Age 0.232 
(0.021) 
0.042 
(0.005) 
0.069 
(0.035) 
0.021 
(0.009) 
0.311 
(0.027) 
0.057 
(0.003) 
0.056 
(0.040) 
0.019 
(0.004) 
Age2 -0.003 
(0.028) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.012** 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
Education 0.267 
(0.005) 
0.023 
(0.000) 
-0.098* 
(0.063) 
-0.006* 
(0.012) 
0.299 
(0.053) 
0.027 
(0.001) 
-0.118* 
(0.135) 
-0.007+ 
(0.017) 
Civil status17F18F* 1.445 
(0.110) 
0.154 
(0.003) 
-0.956 
(0.130) 
-0.093 
(0.126) 
    
Married     0.552 
(0.115) 
0.126 
(0.012) 
-0.800 
(0.168) 
-0.142 
(0.127) 
Divorced     -1.503 
(0.305) 
-0.168 
(0.009) 
-0.209 
(0.014) 
0.083 
(0.058) 
Widow     -2.270 
(0.407) 
-0.214 
(0.023) 
-0.002n.s. 
(0.171) 
-0.010 n.s. 
(0.008) 
Consensual union       0.177 * 
(0.012) 
0.060+ 
(0.015) 
-0.774 
(0.237) 
-0.130 
(0.065) 
Household level variables         
Household size -0.647 
(0.077) 
-0.135 
(0.004) 
0.134 
(0.151) 
0.073 
(0.008) 
-0.816 
(0.085) 
-0.143 
(0.009) 
0.272 
(0.017) 
0.046 
(0.077) 
Household size2 -0.396 
(0.086) 
-0.026** 
(0.007) 
-0.513** 
(0.016) 
-0.025* 
(0.010) 
 -0.013* 
(0.009) 
0.003+ 
(0.001) 
-0.059** 
(0.018) 
0.033+ 
(0.002) 
Number of children 1.151 
(0.037) 
0.129 
(0.034) 
0.298 
(0.065) 
0.079 
(0.034) 
    
                                                 
*=1 if married 
Standard errors in brackets; standard errors adjusted for clustering at the household level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Significance at: + 15%; * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%; n.s. not 
significant. In reference for model (2): single. Other control variables not reported: son/daughter of household head, age3, education2 and native language. 
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Children<5 years     0.940 
(0.046) 
0.215 
(0.075) 
-0.134** 
(0.012) 
-0.072* 
(0.023) 
Children 5-10 years     0.847 
(0.044) 
0.190 
(0.005) 
0.267 
(0.011) 
0.083 
(0.056) 
Children 10-15years     0.904 
(0.043) 
0.202 
(0.017) 
0.249 
(0.096) 
0.074 
(0.067) 
Other dependants 0.681 
(0.026) 
0.126 
(0.078) 
   0.246*** 
(0.062) 
0.063+ 
(0.012) 
0.660 
(0.027) 
0.118 
(0.012) 
0.056 + 
(0.067) 
0.030 n.s. 
(0.052) 
Gender ratio -0.390 
(0.092) 
-0.102 
(0.016) 
1.701 
(0.202) 
0.219 
(0.023) 
-0.293 
(0.084) 
-0.086 
(0.007) 
1.681 
(0.210) 
0.190 
(0.023) 
Number of other migrants 2.359 
(0.047) 
0.294 
(0.056) 
0.790 
(0.059) 
0.098 
(0.015) 
2.782 
(0.055) 
0.323 
(0.025) 
0.982 
(0.060) 
0.112 
(0.089) 
Education of other 
women 
     0.049 n.s. 
(0.013) 
  0.002 n.s. 
(0.001) 
     0.007 n.s. 
(0.014) 
   0.009 n.s. 
(0.027) 
Age of other women   -0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.005* 
(0.075) 
    -0.018*** 
(0.007) 
 -0.006** 
(0.031) 
Wealth index 0.474 
(0.081) 
0.040 
(0.015) 
-0.074** 
(0.058) 
-0.016* 
(0.005) 
0.048 
(0.007) 
0.011 
(0.003) 
-0.042 
(0.002) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
Wealth index2    0.021 n.s. 
(0.132) 
    0.035 n.s. 
(0.081) 
  0.030 n.s. 
(0.049) 
  0.009 n.s. 
(0.021) 
    
House ownership 0.140 
(0.039) 
0.031 
(0.003) 
0.211** 
(0.118) 
0.050* 
(0.001) 
0.106* 
(0.354) 
0.019+ 
(0.002) 
0.266 
(0.011) 
0.067 
(0.048) 
Rural 0.260 
(0.056) 
0.072 
(0.011) 
0.170* 
(0.146) 
0.063* 
(0.017) 
0.241 
(0.052) 
0.069* 
(0.014) 
0.203* 
(0.013) 
0.074+ 
(0.007) 
Informal institutions         
Norm   -0.251 
(0.019) 
-0.062 
(0.013) 
  -0.139 
(0.023) 
-0.049 
(0.001) 
Norm*education      0.121** 
(0.056) 
  0.022** 
(0.014) 
  0.073 
(0.002) 
  0.016** 
(0.001) 
Regional level variables         
Women migration rate   0.144 
(0.003) 
0.025 
(0.021) 
  0.086 
(0.004) 
0.017 
(0.011) 
    ρ (std. dev.)           -0.664 (0.047)           -0.423 (0.046) 
Wald test 88.825 63.524 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 
 47
 
(3) (4) 
Men Women Men Women 
 
Variables 
Coefficient Marginal 
effect 
Coefficient Marginal 
effect 
Coefficient Marginal 
effect 
Coefficient Marginal 
effect 
Individual characteristics         
Age 0.160 
(0.020) 
0.051 
(0.017) 
0.059 
(0.035) 
0.019 
(0.000) 
0.236 
(0.021) 
0.078 
(0.019) 
0.072   
(0.035) 
0.025 
(0.008) 
Age2 -0.020 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
- 0.003* 
(0.000) 
-0.000+ 
(0.000) 
-0.031 
(0.001) 
-0.006 
(0.001) 
-0.021   
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.000) 
Education 0.051   
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.078) 
-0.004* 
(0.017) 
-0.000* 
(0.000) 
0.036   
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.000) 
-0.005*   
(0.014) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
Civil status18F19F* 1.240 
(0.104) 
0.128 
(0.120) 
-1.019   
(0.135) 
-0.114 
(0.003) 
1.440   
(0.110) 
0.170 
(0.073) 
-0.961   
(0.132) 
-0.097 
(0.014) 
Labour market variables         
Blue collars (agri) 0.096+ 
(0.076) 
0.268+ 
(0.092) 
1.192    
(0.219) 
   0.151** 
(0.017) 
    
Menial (agri) 0.865 
(0.125) 
0.240 
(0.107) 
1.220 
(0.339) 
 0.170* 
(0.001) 
    
White collars (ind) 0.089+   
0.128 
 0.022n.s. 
(0.046) 
0.714    
(0.320) 
 0.073* 
(0.024) 
    
Professionals (ind) 0.245   
(0.102) 
0.049* 
(0.015) 
  0.685 **  
(0.327) 
  0.064 n.s. 
(0.033) 
    
Craft (ind) 1.052   
(0.049) 
0.361 
(0.123) 
0.561    
(0.219) 
 0.026* 
(0.019) 
    
Blue collars (ind) 0.256   
(0.093) 
0.063* 
(0.095) 
  0.079 n.s.   
(0.403) 
   0.001 n.s. 
(0.000) 
    
Blue colars (priv ser) 0.689   
(0.079) 
0.120** 
(0.005) 
0.272+  
(0.412) 
  0.007 n.s. 
(0.009) 
    
Menial (priv ser) -0.145+   
(0.113) 
  -0.017n.s. 
(0.001) 
2.130 
(0.194) 
  0.471** 
(0.105) 
    
                                                 
* =1 if married; Standard errors in brackets; standard errors adjusted for clustering at the household level and robust to heteroscedasticity. Significance at: + 15%;* 10%; ** 
5%; *** 1%; n.s. not significant. In reference for model (3):  menial in industry and for model (4): South 
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Craft (priv ser) 0.758    
(0.083) 
  0.166*** 
(0.081) 
-5.020   
(0.312) 
   -0.004 
(0.003) 
    
Professionals (pri ser) 0.342   
(0.079) 
 0.093** 
(0.018) 
0.676** 
(0.403) 
0.060n.s. 
(0.015) 
    
White collars (priv s) -0.026 n.s.   
(0.124) 
-0.005n.s. 
(0.001) 
0.851   
(0.343) 
   0.136 n.s. 
(0.052) 
    
White collars (pub s) -0.122+    
(0.169) 
--0.007 n.s. 
(0.003) 
0.854   
(0.356) 
  0.141 n.s. 
(0.093) 
    
Professionals (pub s) -0.608     
(0.252) 
-0.013*** 
(0.006) 
0.544*  
(0.418) 
   0.032 n.s. 
(0.008) 
    
Menial (public serv) -0.850 
(0.336) 
-0.014 
(0.001) 
1.079   
(0.288) 
  0.112** 
(0.122) 
    
Craft (public serv) 0.332*  
(0.245) 
0.042+ 
(0.015) 
-3.667   
(0.256) 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
    
Blue collars (public serv) -0.174 n.s. 
(0.344) 
   0.008 n.s. 
(0.000) 
-3.612   
(0.257) 
-0.431* 
(0.000) 
    
Household level variables         
Household size -0.709   
(0.078) 
-0.082 
(0.012) 
0.142   
(0.157) 
0.036** 
(0.005) 
-0.644   
(0.077) 
-0.71 
(0.126) 
0.122*   
(0.154) 
0.043+ 
(0.017) 
Household size2 -0.027   
(0.009) 
-0.002** 
(0.005) 
-0.059**   
(0.015) 
-0.007+ 
(0.004) 
-0.030   
(0.009) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
-0.051***  
(0.017) 
-0.021* 
(0.005) 
Number of children 1.227   
(0.039) 
0.164 
(0.029) 
0.330   
(0.079) 
0.113 
(0.016) 
1.144   
(0.037) 
0.187 
(0.116) 
0.500   
(0.065) 
0.126 
(0.052) 
Other dependants 0.726   
(0.028) 
0.102 
(0.016) 
0.427  
(0.085) 
0.075 
(0.031) 
0.678   
(0.026) 
0.091 
(0.097) 
0.138   
(0.062) 
0.054 
(0.033) 
Gender ratio -0.422   
(0.105) 
-0.045 
(0.010) 
1.894  
(0.238) 
0.245 
(0.079) 
-0.383   
(0.092) 
-0.029 
(0.028) 
1.722   
(0.207) 
0.231 
(0.048) 
Number of other migrants 2.149   
(0.048) 
0.329 
(0.036) 
0.860   
(0.072) 
0.111 
(0.021) 
2.335    
(0.047) 
0.348 
(0.034) 
0.832   
(0.057) 
0.103 
(0.088) 
Education of other 
women 
  0.014*    
(0.016) 
0.008+ 
(0.003) 
  0.018 n.s 
(0.013) 
0.006 n.s 
(0.002) 
Age of other women   -0.008  
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.000) 
  -0.013**    
(0.006) 
-0.005* 
(0.001) 
Wealth index 0.045   
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
-0.038  
(0.022) 
-0.015 
(0.006) 
0.027 *  
(0.008) 
0.008* 
(0.006) 
-0.066*   
(0.059) 
-0.023* 
(0.010) 
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Wealth index2     0.039+   
(0.001) 
0.004+ 
(0.000) 
0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
House ownership 0.172   
(0.047) 
0.027 
(0.026) 
0.201   
(0.140) 
0.027** 
(0.008) 
0.134   
(0.039) 
0.056 
(0.045) 
0.219**   
(0.118) 
0.051* 
(0.027) 
Rural 0.273    
(0.060) 
0.028 
(0.003) 
0.084   
(0.146) 
0.021* 
(0.003) 
0.277  
(0.056) 
0.037 
(0.026) 
0.163*   
(0.145) 
0.060* 
(0.043) 
Informal institutions         
Norm   -0.162    
(0.149) 
-0.052 
(0.007) 
    
Norm*education   0.103   
(0.003) 
0.038 
(0.005) 
    
Regional level variables         
Women migration rate   0.112   
(0.005) 
0.013 
(0.071) 
    
North-East     0.084  
(0.055) 
0.073 
(0.005) 
0.319   
(0.141) 
0.202* 
(0.063) 
South-East     0.270   
(0.053) 
0.143 
(0.011) 
0.288   
(0.146) 
0.180* 
(0.075) 
Bucharest     -0.191   
(0.070) 
-0.105 
(0.056) 
-0.333**     
(0.213) 
-0.068* 
(0.003) 
South-West     -0.083   
(0.065) 
-0.054 
(0.022) 
-0.114 n.s   
(0.216) 
-0.033 n.s 
(0.011) 
Centre     -0.026 n.s.    
(0.062) 
-0.021 n.s. 
(0.017) 
0.112 n.s   
(0.156) 
0.049 n.s 
(0.022) 
West     -0.035n.s.   
(0.069) 
-0.024 n.s. 
(0.008) 
0.017 n.s    
(0.180) 
0.005 n.s. 
(0.001) 
North-West     0.042*      
(0.058) 
0.034* 
(0.019) 
0.180**     
(0.146) 
0.089* 
(0.017) 
   ρ (std. dev.)            -0.837 (0.045)          -0.668 (0.048) 
Wald test 65.228 84.516 
Prob> chi2 0.000 0.000 
Appendix II 
Permanent emigration flows 
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Appendix III 
 
 
Once the amount of remittances is observed, the sharing rule can be empirically retrieved and 
the effect of migration on the distribution of wealth and power inside the household can be 
estimated. Following the method set forth by Hélène Couprie (2004), we write the 
maximization program as follows: 
Before any of the member migrates: 
Max [ ji UU )1( μμ −+ ] 
s.t. jj uu ≥  
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The program yields the following Marshallian demand functions: 
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After i migrates the program becomes:  
 
Max [ nmj
m
i UU )1( μμ −+ ] 
s.t. jj uu ≥  
]nmj
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j
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j
nmm
i
m
i
m
i
m lwCplwCp ++++ η nmjmi Φ+Φ≤  
G= G ( ))1( j
m
jj
m
j hded −+γ , where γ  is a productive efficiency parameter 
jj ee ≤  
jj hh ≤  
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10 << γ  
We write the following Marshallian demand functions: 
 
Husband:      
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We can write a similar maximization program in the case that the wife migrates. 
If the wife stays behind, we have: 
)( nmj
nm
jjj CC Φ−Φ⋅=− ∗∗ β , where β is the marginal effect of income on consumption 
identified if the spouse migrates. 
 
Then:                    nmjΦ = nmj∗Φ - [( jj CC −∗ ) / β]               
 
The sharing rule before migration can be retrieved and welfare implications of migration can 
be drawn when one of the spouses stays behind. However, this method requires detailed data 
on consumption patterns.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix IV 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Individual level variables 
 
Men Women 
All International 
migrants 
All International 
migrants 
Variables 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 36.109 21.306 32.004 8.961 38.705 22.299 30.098 8.760 
Education 8.891 4.017 10.290 3.239 7.802 3.954 9.762 3.372 
Married 0.498 0.500 0.557 0.497 0.474 0.499 0.501 0.500 
Divorced 0.023 0.150 0.026 0.160 0.038 0.190 0.084 0.278 
Widowed 0.032 0.177 0.003 0.054 0.135 0.342 0.018 0.134 
Single 0.408 0.491 0.389 0.488 0.317 0.465 0.378 0.485 
Consensual union 0.040 0.195 0.025 0.156 0.037 0.189 0.018 0.134 
Child of head 0.366 0.482 0.428 0.495 0.268 0.443 0.420 0.494 
Spouse 0.008 0.092 0.025 0.156 0.402 0.490 0.300 0.458 
Native language 0.090 0.286 0.131 0.338 0.091 0.288 0.121 0.326 
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Labour Market Variables 
 
Men Women 
All International 
migrants 
All International 
migrants 
Variables 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Craft (agriculture) 0.006 0.076 0.007 0.084 0.000 0.016 0.002 0.049 
Blue collars (agri) 0.111 0.315 0.100 0.300 0.078 0.269 0.097 0.296 
Menial (agriculture) 0.008 0.091 0.029 0.169 0.003 0.057 0.029 0.169 
White collars (ind) 0.013 0.112 0.007 0.086 0.018 0.131 0.008 0.090 
Professionals (ind) 0.016 0.124 0.013 0.115 0.008 0.091 0.005 0.069 
Craft (ind) 0.101 0.301 0.473 0.499 0.041 0.199 0.077 0.266 
Menial (ind) 0.017 0.130 0.156 0.363 0.009 0.092 0.029 0.168 
Blue collars (ind) 0.030 0.171 0.022 0.147 0.023 0.150 0.014 0.119 
Blue colars (priv ser) 0.020 0.139 0.037 0.188 0.001 0.027 0.002 0.049 
Menial (priv ser) 0.022 0.148 0.044 0.206 0.038 0.192 0.599 0.490 
Craft (priv ser) 0.016 0.127 0.035 0.184 0.002 0.041 0.003 0.051 
Professionals (pri ser) 0.019 0.138 0.025 0.156 0.013 0.111 0.012 0.107 
White collars (priv s) 0.013 0.115 0.009 0.095 0.024 0.152 0.021 0.143 
White collars (pub s) 0.006 0.079 0.007 0.082 0.025 0.156 0.030 0.170 
Professionals (pub s) 0.012 0.108 0.007 0.084 0.017 0.131 0.020 0.139 
Menial (public serv) 0.005 0.073 0.004 0.060 0.017 0.128 0.028 0.166 
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Household level variables 
 
 
Men Women 
All International 
migrants 
All International 
migrants 
Variables 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev.
Size of the household 3.849 1.790 4.113 1.768 3.695 1.832 4.002 1.807 
Children < 5 years 0.249 0.559 0.227 0.505 0.246 0.555 0.168 0.432 
Children 5-10 years 0.257 0.557 0.249 0.538 0.253 0.553 0.229 0.530 
Children 10-15 years 0.349 0.649 0.323 0.627 0.338 0.640 0.294 0.593 
Other dependants 0.674 0.877 0.593 0.785 0.655 0.874 0.419 0.701 
Gender ratio 0.424 0.175 0.434 0.179 0.600 0.203 0.597 0.197 
Education of head 9.462 4.069 10.435 3.224 7.177 4.130 9.718 3.376 
Wealth index 5.460 3.514 5.501 3.508 5.593 3.515 5.864 3.504 
Rural 0.488 0.500 0.512 0.500 0.469 0.499     0.458    0.498 
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Regional level variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Men Women 
All International 
migrants 
All International 
migrants 
Variables 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
NE 0.172 0.377 0.272 0.445 0.167 0.373 0.278 0.448 
Bucharest 0.097 0.296 0.029 0.168 0.105 0.306 0.030 0.172 
SE 0.133 0.339 0.205 0.403 0.131 0.338 0.186 0.389 
South 0.157 0.364 0.073 0.260 0.156 0.363 0.066 0.249 
SV 0.109 0.311 0.036 0.186 0.107 0.309 0.025 0.158 
V 0.089 0.285 0.035 0.183 0.091 0.288 0.031 0.173 
NV 0.126 0.332 0.242 0.429 0.126 0.332 0.239 0.427 
Centre 0.117 0.321 0.109 0.311 0.116 0.320 0.144 0.351 
 Appendix V 
Romania:  NUTS II and NUTS III level regions 
 
 Appendix VI 
Labour market variables 
 
 
The occupational categories on the Romanian and foreign labour market were aggregated 
following Constant and Zimmermann (2003). We have in all five occupational categories 
thatwe obtained as follows: 
 
These categories were then crossed with the four sectors: agriculture, industry, private 
services and public services. In the end we had twenty variables describing the status on the 
labour market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY DATA FROM 2002 CENSUS 
Menial Unskilled Blue Collar Workers, Unskilled 
White Collar Workers 
Blue Collar Trained Blue Collar Workers, Semi- 
Skilled and Skilled Blue Collar Workers 
Craft Industry and Other Foremen, 
Independent Farmers, and Master 
Craftsmen 
White Collar Semi-skilled White Collar Workers, Low 
and Middle Level Civil Servants 
Professional Professional, Semi-professional, 
Managerial, Upper and Executive Level 
Civil Servants 
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Appendix VII 
Computation of the wealth index 
 
 
All the goods and services included in the index have been given the same weight. Thus the 
maximum value taken by the wealth index is eleven.  
 
 
(1) Building material quality (= 1 if concrete; = 0 otherwise); 
(2) Water supply (=1 if public; = 0 otherwise) 
(3) Central heating (= 1 if heating is central; = 0 otherwise); 
(4) Sewage system (= 1 if house has sewage system; = 0 otherwise); 
(5) Electricity (= 1 if house has electricity; = 0 otherwise); 
(6) Kitchen (= 1 if house has kitchen; = 0 otherwise); 
(7) Toilet (= 1 if house toilet; = 0 otherwise); 
(8) Bathroom (= 1 if house has bathroom; = 0 otherwise); 
(9) Hot water (= 1 if house has hot water; = 0 otherwise); 
(10) Gas (= 1 if house is recorded to the gas pipe; = 0 otherwise); 
(11) Air conditioning (= 1 if house has air conditioning; = 0 otherwise). 
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Appendix VIII 
 
Gender Norm at the Household level 
 
 
 
The gender norm regarding women’s position in the family was computed on the basis of the 
following questions from the 2000 Romanian Gender Barometer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question Answer considered 
Is it women’s duty more than men’s to 
undertake the housework? 
Yes 
Is it men’s duty more than women’s to be the 
main breadwinners in the household? 
Yes 
In your opinion does a woman have to follow 
her man? 
Yes 
Do you agree that domestic work should be 
paid as any other type of labour? 
No 
Are women more able to take care of 
children than men? 
Yes 
Who should raise the children in a family? Women 
In a family like yours who should lead? Men 
 
